Battle of Antietam September 17, 1862

[milod]

Jax...

 

Yeah, I think from the 1850s forward we had increasing communications difficulties with those larger armies and weapons technologies that far outstripped communications. I'm not sure it was cowardice on the part of higher officers as much as a belief they could command such large masses of manpower and artillery best if well behind the lines with phone lines and such. The weaknesses to that are obvious to us today, at least in part because I think they had no idea of the carnage.

 

m

[jaxson50]

They knew of the carnage, they were replacing men as fast as they could. The nitwits were still using mounted Cav. Units against machine guns. As they are the men who ordered the machine guns they used on their side of the line, I must therefore assume they knew of it's destructive ability. There is no excuse for their disregard of life. It would seem to anyone with a brain, that after the first 60,000 killed in one day, they may want to think about a knew tactic. Tactics were missing in WWI. That was they main reason Pershing refused to place our Dougboys under the direct command of the British or the French.

[jaxson50]

1348132168[/url]' post='1258078']

please allow me to introduce a gentleman that was most likely involved at Sharpsburg(Antietam) IF the 6th Va. Cavalry was there.

 

my Great-Great Grandfather, Evan James Hughes, Corporal, Co.C 6th.Va.Cavalry...he served from the wars beginning, thru Gettysburg, where he lost an eye & was captured.

Here he is, ready to go to war....

 

 

Our ancestors paths crossed, my great great grandfather and his brother both there along their uncle, were at Gettysburg, Uncle Hubert was taken prisioner the first day (157th NY) and was released in a prisoner exchange 10 days later. He went on to be a officer in a USCT company. All officers in the USCT were white. They were sent to Atlanta as part of the occupation force . That must have been fun.

[milod]

Jax...

 

I won't argue that they knew in WWII - and the CW - what was going on in terms of casualties, but OTOH, I think it didn't percolate through their tactical heads that more of the same wasn't really gonna work. As with Lee, a feeling that their frontal breakthrough basically just needed a few more men, one more time...

 

Up to WWI, there was a lot of rapid increase in technology in some ways, but also a tendency to study battles long in the past rather than how to use changing technology. If something worked for Hannibal or Napoleon, it should work with minor variations for...

 

I think nowadays there's more thought to 3-D warfare in terms of place, rather than 2-D, for obvious reasons; and then also a greater consideration of time factors in terms of current technology available to a battle space. In short, an effort to look at principles of warfare to study to determine how principles of the past might be adapted to current technology, rather than examples to follow regardless of different technology and conditions.

 

An acquaintance involved in planning for the first Gulf war made the comment that the days of Hannibal and Patton were long in the past, and a different sort of professionalism is the present and future.

 

In the 1860-1950 era, I think that was a lesson unattended to except at company and lower level. Note that during and after the Korean war, we no longer heard of the Custer charge or the tactical Lee or the Patton or Bradley... It was no longer an era of heroic leaders leading a battle, it was a tactical planning either aided or frustrated by logistics or strategy from higher up. Yeah, you can suggest otherwise with Schwarzkopf, though, and I'd be the last to argue.

 

m