Moral Relativism

[Homz]

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/

 

Moral relativism has the unusual distinction—both within philosophy and outside it—of being attributed to others, almost always as a criticism, far more often than it is explicitly professed by anyone. Nonetheless, moral relativism is a standard topic in metaethics, and there are contemporary philosophers who defend forms of it: The most prominent are Gilbert Harman and David B. Wong. The term ‘moral relativism’ is understood in a variety of ways. Most often it is associated with an empirical thesis that there are deep and widespread moral disagreements and a metaethical thesis that the truth or justification of moral judgments is not absolute, but relative to some group of persons. Sometimes ‘moral relativism’ is connected with a normative position about how we ought to think about or act towards those with whom we morally disagree, most commonly that we should tolerate them.

 

Relativism and Tolerance

 

Relativism is sometimes associated with a normative position, usually pertaining to how people ought to regard or behave towards those with whom they morally disagree. The most prominent normative position in this connection concerns tolerance. In recent years, the idea that we should be tolerant has been increasingly accepted in some circles. At the same time, others have challenged this idea, and the philosophical understanding and justification of tolerance has become less obvious. The question here is whether moral relativism has something to contribute to these discussions, in particular, whether DMR or MMR provide support for tolerance. In this context, tolerance does not ordinarily mean indifference or absence of disapproval: It means having a policy of not interfering with the actions of persons that are based on moral judgments we reject, when the disagreement is not or cannot be rationally resolved. The context of discussion is often, but not always, moral disagreements between two societies. Does moral relativism give us a reason to be tolerant in this sense?

 

Though many people seem to think it does, philosophers generally think they are mistaken. DMR may provide the occasion for tolerance, but it could not imply that tolerance is morally obligatory or even permissible. DMR simply tells us there are moral disagreements. Recognition of this fact, by itself, entails nothing about how we should act towards those with whom we disagree. MMR fares no better. For one thing, MMR cannot very well imply that it is an objective moral truth that we should be tolerant: MMR denies that there are such truths. (A mixed position could contend that tolerance is the only objective moral truth, all others being relative; but it would have to be shown that this is more than an ad hoc maneuver.) It might be said that MMR implies that tolerance is a relative truth. However, even this is problematic. According to MMR, understood to concern truth, the truth-value of statements may vary from society to society. Hence, the statement, “people ought to be tolerant” (T), may be true in some societies and false in others. MMR by itself does not entail that T is true in any society, and may in fact have the result that T is false in some societies (a similar point may be made with respect to justification).

 

Some objectivists may add that in some cases we should be tolerant of those with whom we morally disagree, but that only objectivists can establish this as an objective moral truth (for example, by drawing on arguments in the liberal tradition from Locke or Mill). To the objection that moral objectivism implies intolerance (or imperialism), objectivists typically contend that the fact that we regard a society as morally wrong in some respect does not entail that we should interfere with it.

 

Nonetheless, the thought persists among some relativists that there is a philosophically significant connection between relativism and tolerance. Perhaps the conjunction of MMR and an ethical principle could give us a reason for tolerance we would not have on the basis of the ethical principle alone. Such an approach has been proposed by Wong (1984: ch. 12). The principle is, roughly speaking, that we should not interfere with people unless we could justify this interference to them (if they were rational and well-informed in relevant respects). Wong called this “the justification principle.” Of course, it is already a tolerance principle of sorts. The idea is that it gains broader scope if MMR is correct. Let us suppose the statement that there is an individual right to freedom of speech is true and justified for our society, but is false and unjustified in another society in which the press is restricted for the good of the community. In this case, given MMR, our society might not be able to justify interference to the restrictive society concerning freedom of the press. Any justification we could give would appeal to values that are authoritative for us, not them, and no appeal to logic or facts alone would give them a reason to accept our justification.

 

If the justification principle were widely accepted, this argument might explain why some people have had good reason to think there is a connection between relativism and tolerance. But there is a question about whether the position is stable. Wong derived the justification principle from Kant, and Kant rejected MMR. If we were to accept MMR, would we still have reason to accept the justification principle? Wong thought we might, perhaps on the basis of considerations quite independent of Kant. In any case, this argument would only show that MMR plays a role in an argument for tolerance that is relevant to people in a society that accepted the justification principle. The argument does not establish that there is a general connection between relativism and tolerance. Nor does it undermine the contention that MMR may have the result that T is true in some societies and false in others.

 

In his more recent defense of pluralistic relativism (2006), Wong has argued that, since some serious moral disagreements are inevitable, any adequate morality will include the value of what he calls accommodation. This involves a commitment to peaceful and non-coercive relationships with persons with whom we disagree. Accommodation appears to be related to tolerance, but Wong argues for more than this: we should also try to learn from others, compromise with them, preserve relationships with them, etc. Wong's defense of accommodation is immune to the objection that relativism cannot be a basis for such a universal value because his defense purports to be based on considerations that any adequate morality should recognize. However, for this reason, though it presupposes the considerations supporting the relativist dimension of his position (there is no single true morality), it argues from the non-relativist dimension (there are universal constraints any morality should accept, in particular, that one function of morality is to promote social co-operation). Hence, it is not strictly speaking an argument from relativism to accommodation.

Just Saying~

[Jesus Is Dead In My Basement]

Who are you? KSGs long lost Cousin?

[Homz]

Who are you? KSGs long lost Cousin?

 

I'm not using it in an argument to settle a point. I was just thinking about the term and thought the info I came up with was interesting. You might actually read it and try to understand it.

[The Mick]

Play doh is Americas #1 doh

[pumpkin]

are you the teacher from Charlie Brown?

 

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If the justificMauaMwahtion principle were widely MauaMwahccepted, this MauaMwahrgument might explMauaMwahin why some people hMauaMwahve hMauaMwahd good reMauaMwahson to think there is MauaMwah connection between relMauaMwahtivism MauaMwahnd tolerMauaMwahnce. But there is MauaMwah question MauaMwahbout whether the position is stMauaMwahble. Wong derived the justificMauaMwahtion principle from KMauaMwahnt, MauaMwahnd KMauaMwahnt rejected MMR. If we were to MauaMwahccept MMR, would we still hMauaMwahve reMauaMwahson to MauaMwahccept the justificMauaMwahtion principle? Wong thought we might, perhMauaMwahps on the bMauaMwahsis of considerMauaMwahtions quite independent of KMauaMwahnt. In MauaMwahny cMauaMwahse, this MauaMwahrgument would only show thMauaMwaht MMR plMauaMwahys MauaMwah role in MauaMwahn MauaMwahrgument for tolerMauaMwahnce thMauaMwaht is relevMauaMwahnt to people in MauaMwah society thMauaMwaht MauaMwahccepted the justificMauaMwahtion principle. The MauaMwahrgument does not estMauaMwahblish thMauaMwaht there is MauaMwah generMauaMwahl connection between relMauaMwahtivism MauaMwahnd tolerMauaMwahnce. Nor does it undermine the contention thMauaMwaht MMR mMauaMwahy hMauaMwahve the result thMauaMwaht T is true in some societies MauaMwahnd fMauaMwahlse in others.

 

In his more recent defense of plurMauaMwahlistic relMauaMwahtivism (2006), Wong hMauaMwahs MauaMwahrgued thMauaMwaht, since some serious morMauaMwahl disMauaMwahgreements MauaMwahre inevitMauaMwahble, MauaMwahny MauaMwahdequMauaMwahte morMauaMwahlity will include the vMauaMwahlue of whMauaMwaht he cMauaMwahlls MauaMwahccommodMauaMwahtion. This involves MauaMwah commitment to peMauaMwahceful MauaMwahnd non-coercive relMauaMwahtionships with persons with whom we disMauaMwahgree. MAUAMWAHccommodMauaMwahtion MauaMwahppeMauaMwahrs to be relMauaMwahted to tolerMauaMwahnce, but Wong MauaMwahrgues for more thMauaMwahn this: we should MauaMwahlso try to leMauaMwahrn from others, compromise with them, preserve relMauaMwahtionships with them, etc. Wong's defense of MauaMwahccommodMauaMwahtion is immune to the objection thMauaMwaht relMauaMwahtivism cMauaMwahnnot be MauaMwah bMauaMwahsis for such MauaMwah universMauaMwahl vMauaMwahlue becMauaMwahuse his defense purports to be bMauaMwahsed on considerMauaMwahtions thMauaMwaht MauaMwahny MauaMwahdequMauaMwahte morMauaMwahlity should recognize. However, for this reMauaMwahson, though it presupposes the considerMauaMwahtions supporting the relMauaMwahtivist dimension of his position (there is no single true morMauaMwahlity), it MauaMwahrgues from the non-relMauaMwahtivist dimension (there MauaMwahre universMauaMwahl constrMauaMwahints MauaMwahny morMauaMwahlity should MauaMwahccept, in pMauaMwahrticulMauaMwahr, thMauaMwaht one function of morMauaMwahlity is to promote sociMauaMwahl co-operMauaMwahtion). Hence, it is not strictly speMauaMwahking MauaMwahn MauaMwahrgument from relMauaMwahtivism to MauaMwahccommodMauaMwahtion.

[KSG_Standard]

http://www.moralrelativism.info/argumentfromtolerance.html

 

The (Moral Relativist) Argument from Tolerance

 

The argument from tolerance attempts to establish that moral relativism is true on the basis that the alternative--moral absolutism--is intolerant.

We ought to be tolerant, the argument runs, but to morally criticise other cultures or individuals is intolerant. We should therefore recognise that moral criticism of others is inappropriate; we should become moral relativists.

The Argument is Inconsistent

 

The first problem with the argument from intolerance is that it is inconsistent.

 

On the one hand, it argues that there are no objective moral standards, that morality is a cultural or personal matter.

 

On the other hand, it repeatedly asserts objective moral claims: “we ought to be tolerant”, “we should recognise that moral criticism of others is inappropriate”, “we should become moral relativists”.

 

If moral relativism is true, then each of these claims is false; there is no objective duty to be tolerant.

 

If there is no objective duty to be tolerant, though, then how does the fact (if it is a fact) that tolerance requires relativism bear on the question of whether we should be relativists?

 

Moral Criticism is not Always Inappropriate

 

A second difficulty with the argument is that there are some occasions on which intolerance does appear to be appropriate.

 

If someone tries to steal your car, then you have every right to criticise them; you don’t have to stand back thinking that different people have different standards and that what’s wrong for you might be right for them.

 

A simple appeal to tolerance as a reason to be a relativist is therefore too simple; tolerance isn’t always a virtue.

Relativism is not Necessary for Tolerance

 

A further problem is that it is possible to be tolerant without being a relativist. What does it mean to be intolerant? What would count as intolerance towards someone with whom you disagree?

 

Certainly hurling abuse is intolerant, as is physical violence. It is much less clear, however, that believing that someone is mistaken is intolerant. Tolerance, plausibly, involves treating people with respect; it is not a matter of what one believes but rather of how one behaves.

 

One can believe that a person’s views are false, however, but treat them with respect anyway. It is therefore not necessary to be a moral relativist in order to be tolerant.

Tolerance is Only Possible for Objectivists

 

This point can be developed: not only is it possible for moral objectivists to be tolerant, it is actually impossible for moral relativists to be tolerant. This is because it makes no sense to talk of tolerating the views of those with whom we agree.

 

To be tolerant is to treat with respect those with whom one disagrees; tolerance requires disagreement. The relativist view that every diverse perspective is equally valid and should be recognised as such therefore not only fails to promote tolerance but even makes tolerance impossible.

 

If we accept that everyone is right, that every perspective is true, then we are not being tolerant. To be tolerant we must judge the views of others to be false, and then treat them with respect anyway.

 

We can only judge the view of others to be false, however, if we are moral objectivists. If anything, then, the virtue of tolerance supports moral objectivism, not moral relativism.

[The Mick]

damn

[cookieman15061]

Yaaaawwwnnnnn:-s